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 Gone with the Wind? - Electricity Market Prices and
Incentives to Invest in Thermal Power Plants under
Increasing Wind Energy Supply1
Thure Traber1 and Claudia Kemfert
The increased wind energy supplied to many electricity markets around the world
has to be balanced by reliable back up units or other complementary measures when
wind conditions are low. At the same time wind energy impacts both, the utilization
of thermal power plants and the market prices. While the market prices tend to
decrease, the impact on the utilization of dierent plant types is at the outset unclear.
To analyze the incentives to invest in thermal power plants under increased wind
energy supply, we develop a computational model which includes start-up restrictions
and costs and apply it to the German case. We nd that due to current wind supply
the market prices are reduced by more than ve percent, and the incentives to invest
in natural gas red units are largely decreased. An increased wind supply erodes their
attractiveness further. Consequently, a gap between the need for and the incentive
to provide exibility can be expected.
JEL classication: C63, L13, L94, Q42,
Keywords: electricity market modeling; start-up costs; wind energy; oligopoly;
1 Introduction
Today, wind power provides a cheap source of renewable and carbon free electricity
in many countries. Modest costs per output produced establish a comparative ad-
vantage of wind power over most other renewable energy applications. With fossil
prices on the rise, wind power may also be competitive with conventional sources like
gas and coal red power plants. However, in most countries wind power production
is not subject to market pricing but to governmentally predetermined taris like
the German feed-in tari for renewable energies (FIT). The FIT establishes a guar-
anteed price for every supplied renewable energy production unit, to be purchased
and paid by the established power market participants, and allowed to be passed
through to consumers.
Given such support, wind power has experienced a fast development in the last
decade in many countries, - especially in Denmark, Germany, and Spain, the US, and
China - , and is expected to grow further in the next years. For instance, Lemming
et. al (2007) project the current annual 25 percent increase in installed wind power
to continue until 2015 reaching a global electricity market penetration of 25 percent
by the midst of the century. Other sources project similar gures. For Europe,
1We like to thank for nancial support by the EU project ADAM (018476).
1Corresponding author, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) , Mohrenstr. 58,
D-10117 Berlin, Germany; Email: ttraber@diw.de, Tel.: +49-30-89789409, Fax: +49-30-89789113.
1Eurelectric (2007) calculates with 190 Gigawatt of wind power capacity installed in
the EU 27 by 2030 in its baseline scenario. In the case of Germany, according to
BDEW (2008) almost 40 tera watt hours of wind energy has been produced in 2007,
corresponding to about 23 Gigawatt installed. Furthermore, Nitsch (2008) projects
a production increase of more than 45 tera watt hours to almost 88 tera watt hours
by the year 2020, and a market penetration of wind power in Germany of circa 15
percent.
This development may give rise to problems of reliability of the overall electricity
supply because wind power supply uctuates with day to day meteorological condi-
tions and falls close to zero several times of the year. In addition, electric power can
not be stored economically in large amounts. Thus, the more exible thermal power
plant sector has to provide back-up capacity to cope with hours of weak wind load.
The question is whether the electricity market will provide incentives to commission
appropriate capacities. Two eects of increased wind power are apparent. On the
one hand, wind power erodes the prices received by market based thermal power
plants. On the other hand, the eect of wind power on the utilization of the ther-
mal power plants are ambiguous. While the demand left for thermal power plants
is clearly reduced by the introduction of wind power, the prole of the residual load
is changed by wind power generation such that more exible units like gas turbines
might experience an increase of utilization.
The price eect of the introduction of wind power has attracted some attention
in the contemporary literature. Rathmann (2007) analyzes the support for renew-
able energy supply by using a numerical model with varying assumptions on the
cost structure which are based on historic fuel price and emission market price data.
He shows that renewable energy support can reduce electricity wholesale prices for
certain parameter values. Bode and Groscurth (2006) use a similar model of the
German power sector with exogenous emission pricing and nd a negative price ef-
fect for some consumers which are partially exempted from the burden of the RES
support. Traber and Kemfert (2009) apply an oligopolistic market model and in-
clude an endogenous emission price determination. They nd signicant feed backs
of the emission market since the promotion of renewable energy slackens the emis-
sion market price signals. Hence, two eects of renewable energy support dampen
electricity producer market prices: a substitution eect which reduces the demand
for conventional emission intensive sources and an emission price eect which re-
duces conventional production costs. Furthermore, they investigate the consumer
side of the market2 and nd that the price dampening eect of the emission price
reduction is overcompensated by the price increasing burden related to the support
of RES. However, a criticism directed to these models is that they do not account
for start-up peculiarities which is discussed as an important topic when analyzing
the impacts of uctuating renewable energy supply3.
Unfortunately, start-up costs increase the analytical eort to model cost min-
2In the present paper we focus on the supply side of the market, and therefore ignore eects
induced by the support mechanism on the consumer side.
3The importance of the exibility of thermal power plants for the integration of wind power
has been pointed out by several studies. See for instance DENA (2005) or Oswald et al. (2008).
2imization on the producer side, since they add a xed cost component which is
independent of the subsequent utilization of started-up power plants. The problem
is also known as unit commitment problem which is often analyzed as (mixed) inte-
ger programming (IP) problem. For a thorough description of this type of models see
Hogan (2003). A major disadvantage of IP models is, however, their computational
eort. In addition, solvability for large systems is not guaranteed. Alternatively, one
can use linear programming (LP) models. These models can be much easier com-
puted but they have to sacrice some accuracy, since they are not able to cope with
non convexities arising from decreased part load eciencies. For a recent example
see Kuntz and M usgens (2007).
Some studies analyze the German market in particular. Assessing market power
on the German power market, Weigt and Hirschhausen (2008) account for the costs
induced by start-up processes with a model that combines two optimization stages.
First, a MIP is used to solve the unit commitment problem, and, second, an opti-
mization with xed binary plant status variables taken from the rst step is used
to nd the actual dispatch, i.e. production of electricity. They nd signicant de-
viations from the historic market outcomes, amounting on average to mark-ups of
eleven percent in baseload, and to almost thirty percent in peak load periods. In
the eld of the analysis of eects of wind power support on market prices Sensfu et
al. (2008) use a so-called agent based simulation platform which also accounts for
start-up costs. They nd price reducing eects of about 0:7 Euro cent due to 52:2
tera watt hours renewable energy supply for Germany in 2006.
In the models with start-up costs mentioned sofar, conventional electricity pro-
duction will be completely crowded out by any RES since they are in principal load
fullment models. However, with a comparatively high fraction of heavy industry
consumers with high electricity cost shares as well as options to reduce consumption,
and, given the rather close connections to adjacent markets in the European neigh-
borhood, some elasticity of demand has to be accounted for. A notable example is
provided by M usgens (2006) who uses a linear model (LP), includes international
trade in electricity and nds signicant exertion of market power on the German
market in peak load hours. However, to our knowledge the models applied sofar are
not able to account for market power and start-up eects at the same time.
With the present paper, we try to ll this gap in the literature and present a simple
model that incorporates start-up costs in a market framework with elastic supply
and demand. Together with the wholesale market price eects of the wind power
supply, we study the incentive to invest in thermal power plants. Abstracting from
non convexities and potential dierences between start up state and actual dispatch
of power plants, we develop the mixed complementary programming (MCP) model
ELECTRICITY SUPPLY AND DEMAND MATCH under EMISSION TRADING
and RENEWABLE ENERGY (ESYMMETRY). Similar to many other approaches
to investigate electricity markets, e.g. Lise et. al (2006), Traber and Kemfert (2007),
Bushnell et al. (2008), the model can assess dierent market behavior of important
electricity suppliers: On the one hand, price taking perfect competitive behavior of
all market participants, and, on the other hand, Cournot quantity setting behavior
of large rms under competition of a price taking aggregate of fringe rms.
3In the following section 2 we describe the mathematical model. In section 3 we
introduce the technologies available to conventional power producers in Germany,
and demonstrate the calibration of the model. Section 4 reports results in regard to
prices, emissions, electricity production mix, and the incentives of rms to invest in
new thermal power plants. Finally, section 5 summarizes the results and concludes.
2 Model
The representative rm i maximizes prots from plant operation, i.e. revenues net
of production costs, regarding xed costs as sunk. In each period t of the limited4
time horizon T, the rm's revenues are the product of its production of electricity
in all plants, qi;t, and the market price, determined by the inverse demand P t(Qt),
and the aggregate production Qt of all rms.
We regard a set of conventional production technologies N and denote a single
technology as n. The costs associated with the production of qi:t:n in technology n of
rm i are assumed to be decomposable into a part that applies independently from
the load prole to all produced units, and a part which depends only on start-up
processes, i.e. the load gradient li;t;n. The two parts of the costs are denoted as
variable costs, Ci;t;n(qi;t;n), and start-up costs, Si;t;n(li;t;n), respectively, where the





qi;n if qi;t;n > qi;t 1;n
0 otherwise
8t 2 T;8i 2 I;8n 2 N: (1)
The start-up costs of a period t grow with the load gradient. Therefore, any load
increase in one period will weakly decrease the start-up costs in the following period.
More precisely, the start-up costs of rm i in period t and technology n, Si;t;n, are
assumed to be linear in the load gradient: Si;t;n(li;t;n) = Snli;t;n, where Sn denotes
the start up cost coecient. The variable costs are linear in output and, hence, can
be written as: Ci;t;n(qi;t;n) = Cnqi;t;n:
In addition, the load gradient is restricted to the maximum load gradient, l
n
, in
accordance with the technical characteristic of the technology. For instance, steam
turbines take considerably longer lead times to reach full load compared to gas
turbines. Finally, the load of every rm is in every period and technology restricted
to her maximum available capacity, qi;n, i.e. the product of installed capacity qcap;i;n
and availability an.
The inequality-restricted prot optimization problem of rm i can be expressed





























i;t;n; 8t 2 T;8n 2 N;and
q
i;n  q
i;t;n; 8t 2 T;8n 2 N; (2)
where ~ q i denotes the time prole of production of rm i. The central rst order
condition with regard to production in technology n of oligopolistic rm i in period

















where i;t;n and i;t;n denotes the shadow price of the load gradient restriction and
the capacity restriction respectively. Furthermore, the rst derivative of the inverse
demand is denoted as P 0t(Q).
Small rms regard the price as independent of their output decision, and, thus,












i;t;n  0: (4)
Under perfect competition (4) would represent the behavior of all rms. In the
following section we report results that are generated either under the assumption
of an oligopolistic market or, alternatively, under perfect competition, and discuss
which representation is more appropriate by comparing with historic spot prices
from the European Energy Exchange (EEX) in Leipzig. But rst, the data for the
technology parameters will be introduced.
3 Cost Functions, Data and Calibration





n; 8n 2 N; (5)
where  denotes the emissions price, and pn, en, n and ocn denote the fuel price, the
fuel emission, the degree of eciency, and the variable operation and maintenance
costs of technology n respectively.
The start-up costs Si;t;n are, by contrast, not only depending on the used technol-
ogy, but on the period t and the rm i. The marginal start-up costs of technology
n in period t of rm i which are determined by start-up fuel requirement,sfn, and






n; 8n 2 N: (6)
The main technologies of conventional producers are hydro (HYD), large and
small nuclear (NUCL L, NUCL S), old and new brown coal (BC Old, BC New),
old and new hard coal (HC Old, HC New), natural gas combined cycle (NG CC),
natural gas steam and gas turbines (NG ST, NG GT), and heavy oil steam and gas
turbines (O ST, O GT). Their parameters are taken from DENA (2005) or based
on own information and are outlined in Table 1.
fuel price fuel emission efficiency o&m costs start-up start-up  maximum availability
fuel depreceation load gradient
[cent/kWh] [kg/kWh] [%] [cent/kWh] [kWh/kW] [cent/kW] [%/hour] [%]
HYD 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,26 0,0 0,00 100 0,75
NUC L 0,21 0,00 0,34 0,04 16,7 0,17 4 0,86
NUC S 0,21 0,00 0,32 0,10 16,7 0,17 4 0,86
BC New 0,45 0,40 0,43 0,26 6,2 0,30 8 0,85
BC Old 0,45 0,40 0,34 0,26 6,2 0,10 8 0,85
HC New 0,72 0,34 0,43 0,20 6,2 0,50 14 0,82
HC Old 0,72 0,34 0,34 0,20 6,2 0,15 14 0,82
NG CC 2,17 0,20 0,58 0,13 3,5 1,00 50 0,86
NG ST 2,17 0,20 0,40 0,15 4,0 1,00 50 0,86
NG GT 2,17 0,20 0,35 0,15 1,1 1,00 100 0,86
O ST 1,72 0,28 0,38 0,15 4,0 0,50 50 0,84
O GT 1,72 0,28 0,33 0,15 1,1 0,50 100 0,84
p oc h e sf d l a
Table 1: Technology parameters.
Furthermore, for the representation of the supply side, we utilize plant data of
four major electricity producers, - EnBW, E.ON, RWE, Vattenfall - , and minor
producers aggregated to a set of fringe rms as reported in Table 2. This ownership
representation is based on a multiplicative calculation of ownership shares in power
plants owned by the large rms.
To obtain the seasonal available capacities of the rms, installed capacities have
to be multiplied with seasonal availability factors of the four seasons5: winter from
November until February, spring from March until April, summer from May until
August, and autumn from September until October. We weighted the annual avail-
abilities documented in Table 1 with 6=7 to represent summer and autumn, and
with 8=7 for winter and spring.
The model is applied to simulate a single week. To study a complete year from
November 2007 until October 2008, we calculate four weeks which had a wind yield
that was close to the seasonal average wind production in the respective period.
The winter 2007 - 2008 is represented by the week from 3rd of February until 9th of
February 2008, spring 2008 by the week from 28th of March until 3rd of April 2008,
summer 2008 by the week from 28th of June until 3rd of July 2008, and autumn
5The seasonal disaggregation is chosen in line with DENA (2005).
6EnBW E.ON RWE Vattenfall Fringe
HYD 427 1507 638 0 893
NUC L 3286 7639 3536 904 906
NUC S 733 0 0 514 51
BC New 404 974 1074 3639 217
BC Old 0 346 7544 3664 192
HC New 495 2585 1288 1194 2157
HC Old 2179 7348 3165 473 3979
NG CC 357 417 939 760 2598
NG ST 260 2384 1416 423 1877
NG GT 427 1070 627 920 2073
O ST 328 1476 19 259 287
O GT 112 7 2 387 254
net MW installed 
cap q
Table 2: Installed net electric production capacities of the German electricity sector.
2008 by the week from 8th until 14th of September 2008. The emission permit prices
for these weeks complete the input for the supply side. They are taken from the
download section of EEX and have been 0:025, 22, 27:5 and 23 euro per ton of CO2
for the chosen weeks in winter, spring, summer and autumn respectively.
The demand side is represented by periodic iso-elastic demand which can be







, where  denotes the price elasticity, and Dt
0 and
P t
0 reference values of demand and price respectively. Their values are the realized
periodic market demands from the download section of the UCTE6, and seasonal
hourly average EEX prices respectively. Following the strategy of Green and New-
bery (1992), we try to t the model as close as possible to historic spot market
values. Therefore, the model is calibrated by the choice of the periodic demand
elasticity. We apply either constant elasticities over all periods or periodic elastici-
ties that are inversely related to the seasonal average hourly EEX prices. The latter
assumption is based on the economic logic that possibilities to substitute supply,
e.g. by demand reduction of industrial consumers or increased imports, should be
more scarce in peak load hours and more abundant in weak load hours.
Table 3 documents the calibration procedure for the selected spring-week in terms
of the coecients of correlation, the average dierence of EEX-spot-price to model
price, and the mean of the absolute deviation of model prices and EEX prices. The
rst four rows list the respective results for constant demand elasticities between 0:6
and 0:9, while the last four rows show the results for hourly elasticities of demand
that are the four- to sevenfold of the inverse of the seasonal average hourly EEX
prices. When we compare the model accuracy under the assumption of oligopolistic
competition to that of perfect competition, we nd that the former achieves better
performance in terms of the dierence and deviation from the historic EEX-prices
while the latter assumption achieves a better coecient of correlation.
However, the assumption of perfect competition generates prices that are at av-
6Union for the co-ordination of transmission of electricity, www.ucte.org/resources/dataportal/
7R difference deviation R difference deviation
elasticity
0,6 0,933 -6,9% 13,7% 0,933 14,2% 18,9%
0,7 0,932 -2,7% 13,1% 0,937 13,2% 17,9%
0,8 0,929 -0,1% 13,2% 0,937 12,5% 17,1%
0,9 0,929 1,4% 13,1% 0,936 11,9% 16,5%
scaling factor of elasticity
4 0,934 -7,5% 11,3% 0,935 15,1% 19,3%
5 0,933 0,0% 11,2% 0,939 14,2% 18,4%
6 0,932 3,3% 12,2% 0,940 12,7% 16,9%
7 0,933 4,7% 12,6% 0,938 11,7% 16,0%
Oligopolistic Competition Perfect Competition
Table 3: Coecients of correlation, dierence of EEX-spot-price to model price, and mean
deviation of model price to EEX prices.
erage around 13 percent lower than the EEX prices, while assuming oligopolistic
competition may yield price simulations that at average hit the EEX-price history.
Since both behavioral assumptions yield acceptable Rs of above 0:9, imperfect com-
petition seems to be more adequate to model the German market with our cost
assumptions, and is therefore assumed in the following.
Comparing the setting with constant elasticities to the setting with hourly elastic-
ities we nd rather modest dierences in regard to R and the average dierence from
the historic EEX-prices, but the average deviation of model results is signicantly
decreased to even below eleven percent. These best values achieved are based on
periodic elasticities that are the inverse of the seasonal average hourly EEX prices
in euro cent per kWh multiplied by a scaling factor of ve, and are highlighted bold
in Table 3. This assumption yields elasticities around one, i.e. elastic demand in the
base load hours and inelastic demand in peak load hours. Figure 1 below highlights
the outcome of the calibration in regard to plant dispatch and prices respectively.
The same calibration procedure has been applied to the representative weeks in
winter, summer, and autumn 2008. We found that hourly elasticities with scaling
factors of 7 for winter, 8 for spring, and 5 for the summer achievs best values to
replicate the history of EEX prices.
4 Results
We develop our results by calculating three counterfactual scenarios together with
the analysis of the baseline scenario under current conditions termed Real Wind
(RW). First, scenario Baseload Wind (BW) is chosen to demonstrate the eects that
are induced in the baseline scenario RW by the uctuation of wind energy output,
and assumes that the energy output of wind turbines would be supplied constantly
with its weekly average. Second, we calculate the counterfactual No Wind (NW)

























































Figure 1: Plant dispatch (top), and EEX and model prices (below) in the representative
spring week.
9units. Thirdly, we calculate the scenario Advanced Wind (AW) that assumes a
doubling of the realized hourly wind power supplied in the representative weeks in
order to calculate the impact of the projected wind energy supply increase.
Table 4 reports the results with regard to the volume weighted average price level,
the emissions and the supply of wind and conventional power, where the results for
the representative weeks are transformed by the seasonal weights to get annual
values. The baseline scenario Real Wind yields an average price level of 6:9 cent,
emissions of 344 million tons of CO2
7, and a total supply to German consumers
of 510 tera watt hours. Wind power supplies account for 42:5 tera watt hours or
more than eight percent of total supply. Furthermore, we show the changes that are
induced by the current wind supply of the scenarios Baseload Wind and Real Wind
compared to the scenario No Wind, and the change expected to be induced by the
increased wind supply of scenario Advanced Wind compared to scenario Real Wind.
If we rst consider the changes induced by the scenario Real Wind compared
to No Wind documented in the center column of the bloc on the right of Table 4,
we nd that the price level is reduced by 0:37 euro cent or more than ve percent.
In addition, the emissions decreased by 13;6 million tons of CO2 while the supply
increased by 27:3 tera watt hours. The supply eect comprises of the additional
wind power supply of 42:5 tera watt hours and the reduction of conventional power
plants by 15:2 tera watt hours. In other words, only a little more than one third
of wind power supply has led to a crowding out of conventional resources8. As a
consequence the saved emissions are comparatively small: each kilo watt hour has
reduced emissions at average by only 320 gram of CO2 while the average emission of
the conventional production is more than 670 gram of CO2. If we take the FIT for
wind power of currently 9 cent as implied in BDEW (2008) and the market price for
electricity as cost indicators, the according marginal abatement costs of wind power
are almost 66 euro per ton of CO2.
Nonetheless, the emission reductions of Real Wind are higher than those that
would have been caused by a constant supply of wind power. The rst column
of the bloc on the right hand side of the table shows the induced change by the
Baseload Wind scenario. In this setting the price reduction and the supply increase
would have been more pronounced, and consequently, the emission reduction would
have been smaller. The intuition behind this result is that the increased start up
processes drive prices more than emissions. Combined, both eects increase the
marginal abatement costs of wind power to more than 69 euro per ton of CO2. The
comparison with the Real Wind and the Advanced Wind scenario, however, reveals
only a comparatively small importance of the eects due to the uctuation of wind.
The last column of Table 4 shows the changes due to the doubling of wind power,
i.e. the Advanced Wind scenario, in comparison with the current situation. It
7The calculated emissions of the electricity sector appear to be rather high when compared to
other sources, e.g. Nitsch (2008), since they include the emissions related to combined heat and
power production.
8The support of renewable energy by the German FIT has an additional eect on the demand
side due to increased consumer prices. These eects are not considered here. For a detailed analysis
of these eects see Traber and Kemfert (2009).
10emerges that the price level decreases by another third of a cent, and that the
emission are additionally reduced by more than 17 million tons of CO2. At the
same time supply is almost 23 tera watt hours higher while the crowding out of
conventional supply is 19:6 tera watt hours. Thus, compared to the changes induced
by the current wind power supply, the advanced wind power supply yields an higher
crowding out of conventional supply and a signicantly enhanced emission reduction
per supply, i.e. 400 gram of CO2 per kilo watt hour. Thus, the according marginal
abatement costs of wind power at current support tari is reduced to 60 euro per
ton of CO2. This nding can be explained by a successively higher crowding out of
coal red plants as more wind power is supplied.
Scenario NW BW RW AW BW RW AW
RW
Price level [cent/kWh] 7,27 6,86 6,90 6,57 -0,41 -0,37 -0,33
CO2 [MT] 357,1 344,0 343,6 326,4 -13,1 -13,6 -17,1
Supply [TWh] 482,3 509,6 509,5 532,4 27,4 27,3 22,9
of which
 - Wind 0,0 42,5 42,5 85,0 42,5 42,5 42,5
 - Conventional 482,3 467,1 467,0 447,4 -15,1 -15,2 -19,6
NW
Change compared to
Table 4: Prices emissions and supply in the scenarios together with induced changes.
In the remainder of the paper we analyze the question whether the market ex-
pectations will provide the signals for investments in power plants that are needed
to provide sucient back up capacities for the uctuating wind power supplies.
Therefore, we compute the incentive to invest as the dierence between the average
shadow price of the capacity restriction and the investment costs per output of the
dierent technologies. Note that in our oligopolistic setting the shadow prices of the
capacity restriction varies over rms while the investment costs are the same for all
investors. In line with EWI/EEFA (2008), we adopt investment costs of 1:5, 1:3,
0:7, and 0:2 euro cent per kilo watt hour for new brown coal, new hard coal, natural
gas red combined cycle and simple gas turbines respectively.
In Table 5 we report the incentives to invest for those technologies that are
relevant for the German market9. In a perfect competitive market the incentive to
invest at given prices are equal to the ones reported for fringe rms in the lower rows
of the Table 5. We nd that for all technologies the incentives to invest decrease with
the development of wind supply. Notably, the exible gas turbines loose half of their
attractiveness relative to the No Wind scenario and are always dominated by hard
coal and brown coal as well as combined cycle gas turbine investments. Combined
cycle gas turbines experience a reduction of incentive to invest by almost thirty
percent, while coal based units experience a reduction of only about one fourth.
9Large scale hydro power is not a relevant investment since suitable sites are completely devel-
oped. In addition, nuclear is not an option due to the political decision on the phase out of nuclear
energy in Germany.
11Thus, for rms which act perfect competitively, investments in more exible nat-
ural gas based units are not only dominated by coal red base load units, but loose
competitiveness with the development of wind power. This development will in-
crease the gap between the incentives to invest in exible units and the need of
these units. These ndings suggest that the market is not likely to cope with the
FIT based wind energy increase.
Incentive to invest [cent/kWh], Relative change of AW against NW [%]
BC HC CC NG GT
EnBW
NW 1,5 1,4 1,0 0,2
RW 1,2 1,1 0,7 0,1
AW 1,1 0,9 0,6 0,0
-30% -33% -41% -85%
E.ON
NW 0,6 0,4 0,1 0,0
RW 0,3 0,2 0,0 0,0
AW 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
-100% -100% -100% not def.
RWE
NW 0,7 0,5 0,1 0,0
RW 0,4 0,3 0,0 0,0
AW 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0
-79% -99% -100% not def.
Vattenfall
NW 1,3 1,2 0,7 0,0
RW 1,0 0,9 0,5 0,0
AW 0,7 0,6 0,2 0,0
-47% -52% -68% -100%
Fringe
NW 2,7 2,6 2,1 0,8
RW 2,4 2,2 1,7 0,6
AW 2,0 1,9 1,5 0,4
-25% -26% -29% -45%
Table 5: Incentives to invest in new built power plants under imperfect competition.
Including the incentives of oligopolistic rms in the analysis does not improve the
picture. To the contrary, incentives to invest are the weaker the larger the rm. In
the advanced wind scenario the incentive to invest in natural gas red gas turbines
completely vanishes for the four dominant players. Combined cycle gas turbines
also loose signicantly in attractiveness, - although to a lesser extend compared
with simple gas turbines. The two largest companies E.ON and RWE have no
incentive to invest in combined cycle gas turbines already in the current Real Wind
situation, and the advanced wind supply does not improve that incentive.
For the two smaller strategic companies, Vattenfall and EnBW, combined cycle
gas turbines might still be an option, but compared to the scenario without wind
energy supply their incentive to invest in this technology has been reduced by 68
and 41 percent respectively, bringing it down to almost zero for Vattenfall. Thus,
12the prospects for new gas red units look bleak, especially when the commission of
coal red units is viable.
5 Summary and Discussion
We developed the electricity market model ESYMMETRY which applies dierent
behavioral assumptions in regard to supply of rms and includes start up costs of
thermal power plants. It turns out that a representation of the large electricity com-
panies as Cournot quantity setters is more appropriate under our cost assumptions,
and that hourly elasticities around one yield the closest results compared to the
price history at the EEX.
We nd that the current wind supply of 42:5 tera watt hours from Winter 2007
until autumn 2008 reduced the emissions of the sector by 13:6 million tons of CO2.
Moreover, the reduction of the spot market price of 0:37 euro cent per kilo watt
crowded out about a third of a conventional production unit due to a unit of wind
power. Consequently, the implied marginal abatement costs are more than 66 euro
per ton of CO2.
In order to assess the impact of the uctuating character of the wind supply we
additionally calculate a scenario in which the wind energy is assumed to be supplied
constantly over time. We nd that the real uctuating wind supply is more eective
in terms of emission reduction and less eective with regard to price reduction. Due
to reduced crowding out of conventional production, the marginal abatement costs
of a constant wind supply would increase to 69 euro per ton of CO2.
In addition, we try to shed some light on the impact of an increased wind supply.
We nd that the price dampening eect per unit of wind energy supplied is likely
to decrease while the emissions will be reduced more eectively. It turns out that
the doubling of the wind supply will reduce emissions by more than 17 million tons
of CO2 and prices by only one third of a cent. Hence, the marginal abatement costs
would decrease to about 60 euro per ton of CO2 at current support tari. This
improvement of the eectiveness of the support policy is caused by a successive
displacement of base load coal units with their relatively high carbon intensity.
However, given the marginal abatement costs implied by the European emission
trading system of currently 25 euro per ton of CO2, the promotion of wind power
by the FIT is still an expensive option to reduce emissions in the power sector.
Another central insight is gained in regard to the ability of the market to cope
with the increased intermittent supply of wind power. We nd that the incentives
to invest in exible power plants, e.g. natural gas red gas turbines and combined
cycle units, which are able to cope with strong uctuations, seem to be not sucient.
Rather, the attractiveness of these units is greatly reduced by the development of
wind supply. In particular, large strategic power supply rms do not have any
incentive to invest in natural gas units. These ndings call for a more market based
13approach to wind energy pricing10. If wind energy suppliers had to provide reliability
as the market demands it, they would have an incentive to back up their units by
complementary measures in order to avoid high costs of alternative procurement
in weak wind load hours. In addition to own investment in exible units, these
measures could include demand management, interruptible supply contracts, or the
acquisition of facilities for power storage.
The results in regard to price and emission eects of the wind energy supply which
are obtained in our study are well below the eects calculated by other investigations
which abstract from elastic electricity demand, e.g. Rathmann (2007), Sensfu et al.
(2008). However, even when compared to the results found in Traber and Kemfert
(2009) who use a elasticity of demand of about 0:5 the market price and conventional
production reductions obtained in the present paper are modest. One reason for the
dierences is that total production costs are higher when including start-up eects,
and, thus the elasticities obtained by the calibration are higher, i.e. around one.
The burden of the support system induced on nal consumers might be another
reason for the deviations. Therefore, the inclusion of the renewable support system
could be a fruitful extension of the model.
The investigation of the economics of balancing measures is generally expected
to gain further importance. Not only uctuating wind power is contributing to the
problem of reliability, but also other uctuating supplies, e.g. from solar power. In
addition, carbon capture and storage (CCS) will probably decrease the exibility
of coal red units. While in a carbon constraint world RES and CCS have to
accompany each other, their combination opens up questions in terms of reliability
left for future research.
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